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The Iranian Hostage Crisis and the
Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal:
Implications for International
Dispute Resolution and Diplomacy
Warren Christopher and Richard M. Mosk*
We are pleased to honor Judge Robert Weil, a leader in our community,
a highly regarded jurist and author, and a renowned neutral in alternative
dispute resolution. This is the twenty-fifth anniversary of what has become
known as the Iranian Hostage Crisis. We shall look back on those events in
order to point to possible issues, lessons and solutions for the future.
CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS AFFECTING THE IRANIAN HOSTAGE CRISIS AND
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL
In 1925 Reza Khan, a semi-literate military officer, ousted the existing
dynasty of Iran and had himself enthroned as Reza Shah Pahlavi. Early in
World War II, British and Soviet troops, in effect, occupied Iran and secured
the Iranian oil fields for Allied use. The Shah had become too pro German
for the Allies. So they had Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, Reza Shah Pahlavi's
son, replace him at the age of 22.
In the early 1950s, Mohammed Mossadegh, an elected leftist prime min-
ister, nationalized British and American oil operations in Iran and refused to
pay compensation. The Shah did not back Mossadegh, and mobs called for
the Shah's removal. He fled Iran.
In 1953, the Iranian military, with C.I.A. support, overthrew Mossadegh,
and the Shah was restored to the throne. With a grateful Shah in power, the
United States and Iran signed a Treaty of Amity.
* This article is adapted from the program at the inaugural DRS Robert I. Weil Lecture sponsored by
the Los Angeles County Bar Association Dispute Resolution Services, Inc. on September 25, 2006.
Warren Christopher was Deputy Attorney General (1967-69), Deputy Secretary of State (1977-81),
and Secretary of State (1993-97), and is now the Senior partner in the law firm of O'Melveny &
Myers. Richard M. Mosk was a judge on the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal and is an Associate
Justice of the California Court of Appeal.
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In 1963, the Shah began his "White Revolution" of reform. Clerics led
by Ayatollah Khomeini challenged the Shah's reform programs. Rioting in
Qom was suppressed, and in 1964, Ayatollah Khomeini was exiled to Iraq.
By 1972, the United States decided to allow Iran access to U.S. military
weapons. In return, the Shah became a strong ally of the United States in the
Gulf region. Meanwhile, American businesses invested heavily, and did sub-
stantial business in Iran. The Shah began to increase his powers and used a
feared secret police apparatus, SAVAK.
President Carter had criticized the Shah's abuses of human rights but de-
termined that his value as a military ally outweighed his autocratic measures.
On January 1, 1978, President Carter, meeting the Shah in Tehran, described
Iran as an "island of stability in a turbulent corner of the world."
After the Government-controlled press published an article ridiculing
Khomeini, rioting erupted in Qom. It was suppressed by the Shah's security
forces, triggering a 40 day cycle of protests in ensuing months. On May 15,
1978 a general strike was called by religious leaders. On August 2, 1978 the
Shah declared his commitment to free elections and greater political free-
dom. There were sharp disagreements in the United States government over
what the United States should do. Some predicted the Shah was doomed
and that we should no longer support him. Others maintained we should con-
tinue to support the Shah, even by force if necessary.
In October of 1978, Ayatollah Khomeini was expelled from Iraq and he
ended up in France. In November, in an attempt to end spreading disorder,
including strikes and sabotage, the Shah fired his cabinet and installed a
military government. In Paris, Ayatollah Khomeini said that an Islamic re-
public would be formed by force, if necessary. He announced that all con-
tracts with foreigners would be renegotiated under an Islamic Republic. He
added that when his forces took over Iran, oil shipments to Israel would be
stopped and military ties to the United States would be re-examined. At the
end of November 1978, President Carter reaffirmed his full confidence in
the Shah and said the United States would not interfere in Iranian affairs.
In January 1979, the Shah left Iran on an "extended vacation," and lived
for a time in Egypt, Morocco, the Bahamas, and finally Mexico. On Febru-
ary 1, the Ayatollah Khomeini triumphantly returned to Iran and was
deemed the Imam. The revolution was completed as the Islamic Republic of
Iran was declared. Shortly thereafter, Iranian students briefly occupied the
American Embassy, but soon withdrew. The Embassy then advised unoffi-
cial Americans to leave Iran for reasons of safety. The revolution can be
traced to the repressive and corrupt regime of the Shah, the perception of
Iranians that the Shah was a threat to their culture and religion, and the real
and perceived intervention by foreign powers into Iranian internal affairs.
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On October 22, 1979, the exiled Shah left Mexico and arrived in New
York to undergo treatment for cancer at New York Hospital-Cornell Medical
Center. On November 1, 1979, Khomeini's office in Qom issued a state-
ment encouraging Iranian students to "expand their attacks" against the
United States to force the U.S. to return the deposed Shah. On November 4,
1979, Iranian students captured the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, taking ap-
proximately 100 hostages, including 63 Americans. On November 5, Aya-
tollah Khomeini sent a message of support for the students who had captured
the Embassy, saying that "if they do not give up the criminal [Shah] ... then
we shall do whatever is necessary. . . ." The Ayatollah Khomeini later or-
dered the release of 10 women and African-American hostages, leaving 53
hostages incarcerated. One American hostage was later released because of
ill health.
When the hostages were not released, the United States announced it
would stop importing oil from Iran and froze Iranian assets in United States
banks and their foreign branches. Iran, in turn, repudiated all foreign debts.
Americans began filing about 400 actions against Iran in United States courts
and attaching, and enjoining the transfer of, Iranian assets.
The United Nations Security Council appealed to the Iranian government
for the release of the hostages. On November 29, 1979, the U.S. petitioned the
International Court of Justice at The Hague for a speedy legal judgment against
Iran demanding the immediate release of the hostages. The International Court
of Justice unanimously ruled in favor of the United States and ordered Iran to
release the hostages and restore United States property.
On December 15, 1979, the White House announced that the Shah had
left the United States for Panama, where he established residence. On March 23,
1980, the Shah left Panama for Egypt, one day before Iran was to present Pa-
nama with formal extradition papers. The Shah later died in Egypt.
On April 7, 1980, Ayatollah Khomeini declared that the hostages must
remain in the hands of the students at the Embassy. In response, the United
States severed diplomatic relations with Iran, implemented an economic em-
bargo against Iran, and imposed other economic sanctions. The President or-
dered the Iranian Embassy in Washington and Iran's five consulates closed
and Iran's 35 diplomats and 209 military students in the United States out of
the country.
On April 24-25, the U.S. military launched an operation to rescue the hos-
tages. It was aborted in the Iranian desert after the breakdown of several heli-
copters and a collision between two aircrafts resulted in eight deaths. Secretary
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of State Cyrus Vance resigned his post a few days thereafter because of his
opposition to the rescue mission.
On September 12, 1980, Ayatollah Khomeini listed four conditions for the
hostages' release: return of the late Shah's wealth, cancellation of U.S. claims
against Iran, unfreezing of Iranian funds in the United States, and U.S. guaran-
tees of non interference in Iran. On September 15 and 17, Deputy Secretary of
State Warren Christopher met with an Iranian representative in Bonn, Ger-
many, and opened a dialogue on release of the hostages. On September 22,
1980, however, Iraq invaded Iran's Khuzistan province, and a full-scale war
between the countries began. This outbreak of the war caused the channel
opened by Christopher's meetings to dry up.
On November 4, 1980, Ronald Reagan defeated President Jimmy Carter
in the U.S. presidential election. At about the same time, Iran named Algeria
as an intermediary for hostage negotiations. On November 10, 1980, Deputy
Secretary Christopher led a party of Americans to Algiers and delivered the
U.S. response to Iran's conditions for the release of the hostages. On Novem-
ber 20, the United States confirmed that it had accepted in principle the four
conditions as "a basis for resolution of the crisis." On November 27, according
to a spokesman for the militants, the hostages had been turned over to the Iranian
Government, and the militants no longer had anything to do with them. Intense
negotiations continued.
On December 21, 1980, Iran delivered a note to the United States demanding
$24 billion in assets and guarantees to be deposited in Algeria. The United States
rejected the demand.
On January 6, 1981, Algeria said that Iran was ready to complete a deal if it re-
ceived $9.5 billion in assets at once (down from $14 billion), and the $10-billion
guarantee for the return of the Shah's wealth. On January 15, Iran reduced its de-
mands to $8.1 billion. The United States offered $7.9 billion and Tehran agreed,
dropping altogether the $1 0-billion guarantee requirement.
On January 18, the United States and Iran signed an agreement for freeing the
fifty-two American hostages in Tehran and providing for the return to Iran of billions
of dollars in frozen assets. It was agreed that all claims by Americans against Iran,
by the Iranian government against the United States, and by the two governments
against each other would be submitted to a Tribunal to be established in The Hague.
Thus, claims existing on the date of the agreement January 19, 1981, could no longer
be heard in U.S. courts. Deputy Secretary Christopher signed the documents in Al-
giers a few hours before Behzad Nabavi, chief Iranian negotiator, signed them in
Iran. The two negotiators never communicated directly until years later when they
met informally in a hallway in The Hague during a Tribunal hearing.
On January 20, 1981, last-minute difficulties with the exchange of funds were
overcome. The fifty-two American hostages were released one half hour after
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Ronald Reagan became President of the United States. Deputy Secretary Christo-
pher greeted the released hostages as they arrived in Algiers from Tehran.1
The Algiers Accords (or Algiers Declarations) consist of two declarations is-
sued by the Government of Algeria, together with a number of technical implement-
ing agreements, to which the Governments of the United States and Iran adhered.
The first declaration (General Declaration) provided for the release of the hostages
and a number of United States undertakings, which included the nullification of at-
tachments, the cessation of litigation against Iran in United States courts, and the
transfer of Iranian assets. Of the billions of dollars of frozen funds, a large portion
went to pay certain American bank loans; some of the funds were put into escrow in
connection with disputed interest on these loans; some were returned to Iran; and $1
billion was placed in a "security account" to insure payment of awards in favor of
United States claimants at a Tribunal to be established by the second declaration.
Iran was required to replenish this security account when the balance in the account
falls below $500 million. The United States declared its policy not to interfere with
the internal affairs of Iran.
The second declaration (Claims Settlement Declaration) established an
international arbitral entity, the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, to re-
solve various claims by the nationals of one country against the other
country and the two countries against each other. The United States Su-
preme Court in Dames & Moore v. Regan subsequently upheld the power of
the President to suspend United States litigation and enter into the Algiers
Accords.
2
The Tribunal was to be composed of nine members-three were to be desig-
nated by the United States, three were to be designated by Iran, and the final three,
presumably from other countries, to be chosen by the six government-appointed
arbitrators.3 Pursuant to the Algiers Declarations, a security account for pay-
ment of claims was established in The Netherlands Central Bank.
In May of 1981, the United States and Iran agreed upon the three third
country members to the Tribunal. The first third country members consisted
of two high court judges from Sweden-one of whom was also Marshall of
The Realm-and the Chief Justice of France. Their successors included the
Legal Adviser to the Dutch Foreign Ministry and member of the International
Law Commission, an Argentine former President of the International Court of
See WARREN CHRISTOPHER ET AL., AMERICAN HOSTAGES IN IRAN: THE CONDUCT OF A CRISIS
(1985); WARREN CHRISTOPHER, CHANCES OF A LIFETIME 96-123 (2001).
2 See generally Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
3 See Richard M. Mosk, The Role of Party-Appointed Arbitrators in InternationalArbitration: The
Experience of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, I TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 253 (1988).
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Justice, a Swiss Lawyer, a German law professor, a French law professor, a
Finnish lawyer, a former Polish foreign minister and an Italian professor. The
Iranian members had either been judges, law professors or government offi-
cials in Iran. On July 1, 1981, the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal met for the first
time at The Hague in the Netherlands.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ON ARBITRATION
Modem international arbitration began with the three joint commissions
that were established in 1794 by the Jay Treaty between Great Britain and the
United States. During the nineteenth century numerous arbitral or claims tri-
bunals were established by Governments. One of the most successful was the
Alabama arbitration under the 1871 Treaty of Washington between the
United States and Great Britain to resolve claims arising out of the American
Civil War.
During the late nineteenth century, Governments often either submitted an
existing dispute or group of disputes to arbitration, or provided for arbitration
in a treaty to cover disputes that might arise. During the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries, a quasi-public international process developed whereby claims of
individuals against foreign States were adjudicated. Originally the claimants
were not parties; rather the State in which they were nationals was the party,
and the state espoused their nationals' claims. These so-called mixed commis-
sions were established to deal with claims for injuries to nationals of one or
another Government.
A significant instance of a settlement on a large scale was the Venezuelan
arbitrations of 1903. Various Governments claimed their nationals had been
injured by Venezuelan authorities during a civil war. The commissions sat in
Caracas to determine these claims. Claims commissions were also established
to deal with damages to foreign property arising out of the Boxer Rebellion in
China.
In 1899, a Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes
established a body known as the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague.
The court was created to promote and facilitate international arbitration among
Governments. The Permanent Court of International Justice was established in
1921. It was an adjudicative mechanism for Governments to resolve disputes.
Its successor, the International Court of Justice, was established after World
War II. Also, following World War I, several mixed arbitral tribunals to adju-
dicate claims associated with the combatants of that war were established by the
Treaty of Versailles.
There have been a number of claims commissions arising out of injury to
nationals of States from the Mexican revolutions. Following World War II
there were also various tribunals to resolve disputes and claims. Often gov-
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emments agreed to settle claims by paying a lump sum, with the government
receiving the funds distributing them to its nationals, often through a claims
mechanism.
Among Governments, there have been ad hoc arbitrations, quasi-
permanent tribunals and other forms of claims mechanisms. There are also spe-
cialized bodies, such as the European Commission and Court of Human Rights
and the Law of the Sea Tribunal. The number and variety of intergovemmen-
tal dispute mechanisms have been extensive. They are often provided for in Bi-
lateral Investment Treaties (BITs). In addition, War Crimes Tribunals have
been established.
THE IRAN-U.S. CLAIMS TRIBUNAL
The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal is a modem and highly developed
claims tribunal. Professor Richard Lillich referred to the Tribunal as "the
most significant arbitral body in history." 4 The Tribunal is the largest bilat-
eral international claims adjudication program ever. Until the creation of the
United Nations Compensation Commission, it was the largest claims pro-
gram in history. It is unique in being a program between a Western country
and a non-Western country. 5 It is a hybrid international arbitration mechanism
involving, on the one hand, commercial and non-public international law issues
and, on the other hand, intergovernmental disputes and other disputes that call
for the application of public international law. Nationals present their own
claims, except for claims under $250,000 ("small claims"), which are pre-
sented by the governments. The Tribunal has been referred to as "a unique in-
stitution, representing one of the most ambitious and complex international claims
adjudication programs ever undertaken. ' 6
There were 3844 claims filed, of which 2795 were small claims. An addi-
tional large number of claims by Iranian nationals against American nationals
were dismissed as being outside the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. The Iran-
United States Claims Tribunal has resolved all of the claims of nationals of
one Government against the other and many of the inter-governmental claims.
The total amount of the awards to American claimants exceeds $2.5 billion, all
of which have been paid. The Tribunal is still dealing with large inter-
' THE UNITED STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL 1981-1983 vii (Richard Lillich ed., 1984).
'Id. at 8.
6 David P. Stewart and Laura B. Sherman, Developments at the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal:
1981-1983, 24 VA. J. INr'I L. 1,6 (1983).
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governmental claims, generally by Iran claiming damages arising out of the
Foreign Military Sales program and properties allegedly not returned to Iran.
These claims involve thousands of individual transactions.
Operation of the Tribunal
The Claims Settlement Declaration provided that the United Nations Com-
mission on International Trade Arbitration Rules or UNCITRAL Rules, as modi-
fied, would apply. The Tribunal adopted these rules with some modification.
The Tribunal divided into panels of three to hear cases, although certain impor-
tant issues were heard and decided by the full Tribunal of nine. Although the Tri-
bunal has been referred to as an arbitral body because of its caseload, it more
nearly resembles a judicial system. All claims were required to be filed within
one year of the Algiers Declarations.
In their claims, responses, rebuttals and surrebuttals, the parties supplied
their contentions and evidence; these included witness statements, documents,
and legal arguments. A party could request the Tribunal to order the other
party to produce certain documents. Because the UNCITRAL Rules provide
that either side could demand a hearing, hearings were invariably held at which
each side was expected to produce as a witness anyone whose statement had been
submitted. This person could amplify upon his or her statement, be subjected to
cross-examination by the other side and be available for questions by the Tribu-
nal. Although the Tribunal could and did appoint experts, each side often pre-
sented its own experts. The civil law process of submitting all material in writ-
ing reduced the length of hearings substantially. The Tribunal applied choice-of-
law principles that it deemed applicable. 7
Accomplishments of the Tribunal
International arbitration involving governments, even under the best of cir-
cumstances, has had mixed results throughout history. The tribunals most likely
to succeed are those between friendly countries--or at least states that are no
longer hostile-and those created to resolve boundary disputes or a dispute in-
volving a single incident. Some claims mechanisms between victor and van-
quished nations have also operated successfully.
The fran-United States Claims Tribunal was created under difficult circum-
stances. Iran and the United States did not have diplomatic relations and they
were hostile to one another. Both Iranians and Americans were skeptical about
the Tribunal and often criticized it.
7 See Richard M. Mosk, Lessons from the Hague-An Update on the Iran-United States Claims Tri-
bunal, 14 PEPP. L. REV. 819 (1987).
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The Tribunal, which is an international entity, obtained premises, appointed
an international staff, received and processed the claims, developed procedures,
promulgated rules, and made provisions for the translation and interpretation of
documents and proceedings into two languages: English and Persian. Each
country appointed a representative to the Tribunal known as the Agent. Iran and
the United States have been contributing funds in equal amounts to support the
Tribunal, and both countries have supplied personnel.
The Tribunal rendered numerous published written opinions, including
dissenting and concurring opinions. All of these opinions included discus-
sion of international and commercial law and have had a substantial effect
on the clarification of the law of state responsibility for damaged aliens. The
Tribunal generally did not resolve issues on the basis of municipal or local
law. Thus, the Tribunal has had an influence on the development of general
principles of commercial law, or what some have referred to as "Lex Merca-
toria."
Although there was a reluctance to deal with politically sensitive issues,
ultimately the Tribunal did so. These issues included the application of the
Treaty of Amity, the standard of compensation, interest, the application of
the International Monetary Fund agreement, expropriation, standard of com-
pensation, dual nationals, exchange controls and rates, wrongful expulsion,
treaty interpretation, force majeure, and many more. There were also many
significant procedural and evidentiary issues, including questions of jurisdic-
tion.
The procedures, which had to accommodate different legal systems,
were workable, although adherence to and enforcement of the rules were at
times erratic. In addition, the Tribunal has been the only place where the
United States and Iran have had overt relations and maintained a place for
contact.
The Tribunal has exposed many lawyers to international arbitration,
thereby expanding the use of international arbitration as an alternative dis-
pute resolution mechanism and increasing the opportunities for lawyers in
that field. It has been the model for subsequent tribunals such as the Ethio-
pian-Eritrean Tribunal and, in part, for the United Nations Compensation
Commission.
REFLECTIONS ON THE HOSTAGE CRISIS
Prior to the crisis and at the time of the revolution, the United States re-
evaluated its relationship with Iran. In view of Iran's location and resources,
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the United States did not sever its ties with that country, either before or after
the Revolution, before the November 1979 hostage taking.
Following the November 4, 1979 hostage taking, the United States gov-
ernment expected Iranian authorities to rescue embassy personnel as they
had in a similar incident the prior February. When that did not occur, the
United States froze Iranian assets, imposed other economic sanctions and
sought international support, including filing a case in the International
Court of Justice. Thereafter, U.S. businesses and banks were required to cur-
tail their activities in Iran.
The United States explored every possible diplomatic avenue to free the
hostages. While military options were rejected initially, the President's
threat of military retribution if the hostages were harmed or brought to trial
had a deterrent effect.
Because of internal political maneuvering in Iran, meaningful negotiations did
not take place until September of 1980, but those initial discussions in Germany
collapsed after the outbreak of the Iraq-Iran war in late September. In November
1980 negotiations resumed, with the Algerians serving as skilled intermediaries
and facilitators, and to some extent as mediators.
The negotiations proceeded even after President Carter had been defeated in
the election by Ronald Reagan. The negotiations entailed issues concerning the
return of the foreign assets, repayment of debts owed by Iran to U. S. banks, the
resolution of claims by Americans, the return of the Shah's assets and noninter-
vention by the United States in Iranian internal matters. Intense negotiations led
to the signing of the Algiers Declarations on January 19, 198 1--one day before
the inauguration of President Reagan.
On January 20, 1981, after various transfers of funds, the hostages were re-
leased in Algiers, and the incoming Reagan administration complied with the
agreements. In retrospect, it appears that the United States was able to respond
flexibly to Iran's demands, while preserving American honor by returning only
frozen assets and thus not paying blackmail. The reciprocal claims were re-
solved under favorable terms for American claimants.
The Tribunal proved to be a creative way of dealing with a difficult situa-
tion. Americans insisted on recourse, and Iran refused to litigate in American
courts. Even if the cases had been allowed to be pursued in United States courts,
defenses such as sovereign immunity made recovery uncertain. Moreover, there
undoubtedly would have been multiple claims on the Iranian assets.
American claimants, for the most part, were satisfied with the Tribunal.
While the Tribunal has not completed its work and so we cannot finally evaluate
its performance, it has resulted in many positive contributions.
In sum, the Iranian hostage crisis demonstrates that through hard work, pa-
tience, persistence and creativity, even the most intractable situation may be subject
to a favorable resolution. Whether comparable crises can be resolved favorably
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depends on the rationality of adversaries, available leverage, the support of the
international community, and the resolve of the American public.
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